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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
WILLIAM J. ACEVES†
INTRODUCTION
The human rights movement has long sought to find
arguments in support of rights that do not rely solely on morality
or normative suasion.1 Granted, some scholars, from Amartya
Sen to Ronald Dworkin, argue that human rights are worth
protecting even if it is inefficient to do so.2 Other scholars,
including Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, suggest that
states have a responsibility to protect human rights as a basic
obligation that arises from their sovereign status within the
international community.3 But, such calls are often met with
skepticism, particularly by governments that must make difficult
resource allocation decisions.4 Protecting human rights can be a
costly endeavor. Not all rights can be protected, and trade-offs
are inevitable.5
†
William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California
Western School of Law. Beth Van Schaack and Donald Smythe offered helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Regina Calvario, Erin Dimbleby, Laura Goolsby,
Warsame Hassan, Sahar Karimi, and Melia Thompson-Dudiak provided excellent
research assistance. All errors and opinions are the author’s sole responsibility.
1
See, e.g., ARI KOHEN, IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A NON-RELIGIOUS
GROUNDING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 3 (2007); WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN
BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 6–7 (2001);
KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 15–16 (2017).
2
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24–25 (1977); AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999); cf. SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 16; Martha C.
Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 281 (1997).
3
INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 13 (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
ICISS%20Report.pdf; see also RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 108 (2011); Anne
Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 522–26
(2009).
4
Cf. Aoife Nolan, Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and
Economic Crisis, 2015 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 360, 368–69 (2015); Lutz Oette,
Austerity and the Limits of Policy-Induced Suffering: What Role for the Prohibition of
Torture and Other Ill-Treatment?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 669, 670 (2015).
5
See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Enforcing Legal
Rights, 4 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 71–73 (1995). Studies on the costs of human rights
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This Article considers whether cost-benefit analysis can
provide the human rights movement with the answers it seeks.6
It offers an instrumentalist and empirical approach to
complement the normative arguments that are most often used
by the human rights movement. If human rights could be fully
monetized, states could consider the full range of benefits that
arise from protecting rights and the costs that occur when rights
are violated. This approach could provide states with a more
accurate methodology for making decisions that affect human
rights. In fact, protecting human rights may prove to be costeffective, particularly when second order costs are considered,
thereby offering a compelling argument for their defense.7
I.

THE CALCULUS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Cost-benefit analysis is a commonly used decision-making
methodology that facilitates the allocation of state resources and
the selection of economically efficient policies.8 This methodology
requires the monetization of all relevant costs and benefits.
Some costs and benefits are easy to monetize; others are not.
When values cannot be readily monetized, they must still be
incorporated into the analysis. Through the monetization of all
relevant values, cost-benefit analysis quantifies the risks and
rewards of discrete decisions.9
This allows for effective
typically address economic, social, and cultural rights. See generally Eitan Felner,
Closing the ‘Escape Hatch’: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realization of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 402 (2009).
6
Some commentators suggest that advocates should use cost-benefit analysis
because it is “here to stay” and can offer unique opportunities. See MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10–11 (2008);
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later,
48 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“By learning how to use cost-benefit analysis to
advance their agendas, protection-oriented groups (such as environmentalists, labor
unions, and consumer groups) could help correct historical biases and bad practices
that have crept into the methodology of cost-benefit analysis.”).
7
In recent years, the use of rational choice methods to study international law
has grown in prominence. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
249 (Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi eds., 2016); RESEARCH METHODS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 229, 257 n.14, 261 (Bård A. Andreassen et al. eds.,
2017). For one of the earliest studies, see William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis
of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the Concept of State Practice,
17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995 (1996).
8
See LIVERMORE & REVESZ, supra note 6, at 12.
9
See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to The
Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1054 (2004). See generally William Meadow & Cass
R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 (2001). Cost-benefit analysis is
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comparisons between competing policies.
Through such
comparative methodology, cost-benefit analysis can facilitate the
selection of the most economically efficient policies.10
Governments regularly use cost-benefit analysis to make a
broad array of decisions.11 Indeed, this methodology has become
a centerpiece of the modern regulatory state. Government
agencies are often required to conduct cost-benefit analysis when
considering policies that may have a significant political,
economic, or social impact.
As a result, regulations on
environmental standards, health requirements, transportation
rules, and worker safety protocols have been considered and
adopted when their monetized benefits exceeded expected costs.12
On other occasions, proposed regulations have been rejected
when their costs would exceed expected benefits.13
In the United States, federal agencies are required by
Executive Order 12,866 to use cost-benefit analysis when making
regulatory decisions.14
This analysis must consider “both
quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be
usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential
one of several decision-making methods. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 31–49 (1978). The precautionary principle, which counsels caution
in the face of uncertainty, offers a competing methodology. DANIEL STEEL,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 2 (2015).
10
See generally ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5th
ed. 2018); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); RISKS, COSTS, AND
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed.,
1996); HAROLD WINTER, TRADE-OFFS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING
AND SOCIAL ISSUES (2005).
11
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 3–4
(2014). Some countries are less receptive to the use of cost-benefit analysis in the
decision-making process. Marion Fourcade, The Political Valuation of Life, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 291, 295–96 (2009).
12
While commonly used, cost-benefit analysis is subject to significant criticism.
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 92–114 (2012); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 46 (2010);
Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
971, 975 (2000).
13
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 17–18.
14
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Lisa A.
Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions, 1 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 283, 285 (2007). See generally STEPHEN BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (7th ed. 2011); CHRISTOPHER HOOD
ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES
(2001).
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to consider.”15
In addition, federal agencies undertaking
“significant regulatory action” are required to prepare detailed
regulatory assessment plans that consider the costs and benefits
of proposed action. These plans are required when regulatory
action would result in a rule that may “[h]ave an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities.”16 Regulatory
assessment plans must be submitted for review and approval to
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), which
is located within the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”).17 With limited exceptions, decisions to accept or reject
regulations that constitute significant regulatory action are made
using cost-benefit analysis. If the anticipated benefits exceed the
costs, OIRA will approve the regulations. If the anticipated costs
exceed the benefits, OIRA will reject the regulations unless a law
requires their adoption.18
Cost-benefit analysis is also used outside the United States.
For example, cost-benefit analysis has been used to study largescale water projects in India and China.19 Researchers have used
cost-benefit principles to study deforestation in the Amazon
15

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. § 1(a).
Id. § 3(f). A “significant regulatory action” is also defined to include rules that
may “[c]reate a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or
planned by another agency,” that may “[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of
recipients thereof,” or that may “[r]aise novel legal or policy issues arising out of
legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this
Executive order.” Id.
17
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 16–26. For a recent example of a regulatory
impact analysis, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
THE PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM
EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS: REVISIONS TO EMISSION
GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW
PROGRAM (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/util
ities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf. See generally Christopher Aluka Berry, Trump’s
New Power Plan Comes with a Deadly Price, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/trump-new-power-plan-air-pollution-deaths/.
18
See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 519–22 (1981)
(concluding that Congress required the implementation of appropriate regulatory
standards to protect worker health even if such regulations were unsupported by
cost-benefit analysis).
19
See generally Hisham El-Bihbety & Harvey Lithwick, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Water Management Mega-Projects in India and China, in THE ARID FRONTIER:
INTERACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 295 (Hendrik J.
Bruins & Harvey Lithwick eds., 1998).
16
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region.20 From air pollution in Singapore to fuel standards in
Mexico, the principles of cost-benefit analysis have been used on
countless occasions throughout the world to assess government
policies.21 Its effectiveness as a decision-making methodology is
evidenced by its ability to address such a diverse array of issues
in an equally diverse group of countries.
Cost-benefit analysis is used by private entities as well as
governments. For example, corporations routinely use costbenefit analysis in their decision-making processes. On some
occasions, corporations use this methodology in deciding whether
to pursue certain business ventures.
On other occasions,
corporations use cost-benefit analysis to engage in risk
assessment, such as whether to install safety features in their
products.22 Even individuals make personal choices—from using
certain modes of transportation to selecting particular medical
procedures—that involve the simple balancing of financial costs
and personal benefits.23 The prevalence of cost-benefit analysis
as a decision-making methodology is explained, in part, by its
simplicity. As noted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
“people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”24 Thus,
many private decisions are made through cost-benefit analysis.
But whereas corporations and individuals are concerned about
private welfare, governments must consider the social costs of
their decisions.
20

See generally LYKKE E. ANDERSEN, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
DEFORESTATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON 27 (1998).
21
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore et al., Global Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3, 10
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013).
22
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 547, 572–73 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing Lives for Corporate and
Governmental Risk Decisions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2015); cf. Gary T.
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1991).
23
See, e.g., Glenn C. Blomquist et al., Values of Risk Reduction Implied by
Motorist Use of Protection Equipment: New Evidence from Different Populations, 20
J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 55, 55 (1996); Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham,
The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97,
116–17 (1989); Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and
Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & ECON. 79,
80 (1995); Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the
Value of Statistical Life, 73 S. ECON. J. 659, 661 (2007).
24
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
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II. THE VALUE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
To those who study human rights (and to those who promote
these rights), cost-benefit analysis offers an intriguing and
provocative opportunity. State action in support of human rights
is often criticized as being ineffective or inefficient.25 Protecting
human rights is also seen as an expensive proposition.26 While
such criticisms are quick to point out the financial costs of
protecting rights, they seldom engage in a rigorous assessment of
the monetized and non-monetized benefits.27
Assessing the benefits of protecting human rights requires
consideration of the costs that occur when rights are violated. If
human rights could be quantified through the conversion of
monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits into a common
unit of measure, states could more accurately consider the net
benefits of protecting human rights.
Perhaps the most
undertheorized benefit is the value of the human right itself,
which involves the monetized benefit of avoiding the loss of that
right. This can be assessed through contingent valuation.28 For
example, stated preference studies use surveys to measure how
much people would be willing to pay in order to reduce or
eliminate discrete threats or harms.29 Revealed preference
studies use observational data of human behavior to make
similar determinations.30
Other related benefits—or cobenefits—that arise from the protection of human rights can
include the ongoing social and economic productivity of those
individuals whose rights are not violated. When these values are
extrapolated across an entire population, the monetized benefits
of protecting human rights are significant. Many of these
benefits are recurring. These future benefits must also be
incorporated into the analysis, subject to an appropriate discount
rate.

25

See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1382–84
(2005); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE
RES. 95, 95 (1999); cf. Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health
Care and Education in Developing Countries, 32 WORLD DEV. 465, 467–68 (2004).
26
Gauri, supra note 25, at 467, 472.
27
Id. at 472–73.
28
See, e.g., Ike Brannon, What is a Life Worth?, 27 REG. 60, 61 (2004).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 60–61.
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Other benefits merit consideration.31 These include the
emotional benefits that accrue to the family and friends of
individuals whose rights are not violated. They can include the
moral interests of community members who value the human
right and would suffer from its loss. Other non-monetized
benefits which inure to the benefit of the country that protects
human rights include promotion of the rule of law and political
stability.32 Diplomatic benefits may also accrue.
Admittedly, not all the benefits that result from the
protection of human rights can be readily monetized or subject to
contingent valuation studies. And yet, these non-monetized
benefits can be significant and should be incorporated into the
analysis. These non-monetized benefits can be assessed through
breakeven analysis, which considers how significant these
benefits would need to be in order to justify their costs.33
Breakeven analysis can be used to identify the value of a
proposed benefit even when that benefit is not amenable to
standard monetization.
It functions through a process of
inductive reasoning by using the known costs to determine the
benefits needed to justify those costs. Breakeven analysis is
regularly used in cost-benefit studies to ensure that even nonmonetized benefits are considered.34
It may seem puzzling to consider the financial benefits
associated with the prevention of human rights abuses. But, in
fact, similar studies are routinely performed to assess the
financial benefits of crime prevention.35 These studies consider
both the tangible and intangible costs of crime and the
corresponding benefits associated with crime prevention. The
31

See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in CostBenefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809 (2017).
32
See, e.g., Ariel Benyishay & Roger R. Betancourt, Civil Liberties and
Economic Development, 6 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 281, 283 (2010); Lorenz Blume &
Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Human Rights, 60 KYKLOS 509, 518–24 (2007);
Axel Dreher et al., Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights, 56 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 516, 522–24 (2012).
33
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 65–66; Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of
Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1375–79 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, The
Limits of Quantification].
34
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, supra note 33, at 1385–89.
35
See, e.g., Brandon C. Welsh et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis of Crime Prevention
Programs, 44 CRIME & JUST. 447, 447–49 (2015); see also COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34–36 (2016); John Roman,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Criminal Justice Reforms, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Sept. 2013,
at 30, 31.
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benefits of crime prevention can include the cost savings to
victims, taxpayers, and even to perpetrators.36 By calculating the
costs of discrete crimes—from murder and rape to even low-level
offenses—governments can determine the appropriate allocation
of state resources to protect society.
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) provides a good
example of cost-benefit analysis in the crime prevention field.
Congress adopted PREA in 2003 to address the ongoing problem
of sexual abuse in the U.S. prison system.37 PREA established
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, which was
tasked with investigating the causes of sexual abuse in the
prison system and considering potential solutions. In 2009, the
Commission issued its findings, including an extensive list of
recommendations.38
Based on these recommendations, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) developed a proposed set of
regulations that were then subjected to public review.39
As part of the regulatory review process, the DOJ performed
a cost-benefit analysis that compared the costs of implementing
the proposed regulations with the benefits associated with the
reduction of sexual abuse in the prison system.40 In calculating
the proposed benefits, DOJ considered the value associated with
the monetized benefits of avoiding sexual abuse.41 This value
was then compared with the anticipated costs of
implementation.42 Through a rigorous assessment of these costs
and benefits, the study concluded that the proposed benefits of
implementation would exceed the expected costs. Indeed, the
36

CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUST., COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 16–20 (2014), https://storage.goog
leapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/cost-benefit-analysis-and-justicepolicy-toolkit/legacy_downloads/cba-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf; JENNIFER ROSENBERG
& SARA MARK, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, BALANCED JUSTICE: COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 10 (2011), https://policyinteg
rity.org/publications/detail/balanced-justice/.
37
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972
(2003).
38
NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 237 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
226680.pdf.
39
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 9–11 (2012), https://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf.
40
See generally id.
41
Id. at 39–69.
42
Id. at 70–156. See generally BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION ACT (PREA) COST IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINAL REPORT (2010),
https://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/preacostimpactanalysis.pdf.
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calculations were striking. The costs of implementing the PREA
regulations were approximately $468 million, whereas the
benefits in eliminating sexual abuse could reach $52 billion
annually.43 This amount did not include several non-monetized
benefits, such as the benefits that would accrue to society by
avoiding sexual violence.44 Eventually, the PREA regulations
were adopted.45
This example is by no means unique. Cost-benefit analysis
has been used in a variety of areas that implicate human rights.
For example, the rights of persons with disabilities have been the
subject of several cost-benefit studies as part of the review and
approval process for federal regulations implementing the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).46
These studies
assessed both the monetized and non-monetized benefits of the
proposed ADA regulations.47 Cost-benefit studies have also been
conducted to assess what constitutes acceptable levels of
carcinogens in the water supply or pollutants in the air, both of
which implicate the quality of life and life itself.48
In sum, cost-benefit analysis could provide states with an
innovative methodology for making decisions that affect human
rights. By monetizing human rights, states could determine
which rights are cost-effective, and should be protected, and
which could be deferred because their costs exceed potential
benefits. Moreover, if rights cannot be protected at any cost, it
would be inefficient to allocate resources to protect them. This
analysis could be performed on a variety of human rights, from
civil and political rights to economic, social, and cultural rights.
If the goal of human rights is to promote social welfare, cost-

43

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1–2.
Id. at 66–69.
45
28 C.F.R. § 115.11(a) (2018).
46
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 76–77; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (2018).
47
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE
FINAL REVISED REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING TITLES II AND III OF THE ADA,
INCLUDING REVISED ADA STANDARDS FOR ACCESSIBLE DESIGN (2010),
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final%20RIA.pdf.
48
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 55–59, 94; see also Benefits and Costs of the
Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-actoverview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act (last visited Nov. 15, 2018); Economic
Analysis
and
Statutory
Requirements,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/dwregdev/economic-analysis-and-statutory-requirements (last
visited Nov. 15, 2018).
44
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benefit analysis offers a viable and tested methodology to assess
the success or failure of such efforts. Human rights advocates
could also use this methodology in their own advocacy work.
III. APPLYING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO HUMAN RIGHTS
The principles of cost-benefit analysis can be applied to
human rights in several ways. In the United States, federal
agencies are required to consider whether a proposed treaty
would result in significant regulatory action.49
If so, the
applicable federal agency must consult with OIRA and convey
the outcome of such consultations to the U.S. Department of
State.50 This obligation is codified in the Foreign Affairs Manual,
which governs the operations of the Department of State.51
If a proposed agreement embodies a commitment
that could reasonably be expected to require (for
its implementation) the issuance of a significant
regulatory action (as defined in section 3 of
Executive Order 12866), the agency proposing the
arrangement shall state what arrangements have
been planned or carried out concerning timely
consultation with the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for such commitment.
The
Department of State should receive confirmation
that OMB has been consulted in a timely manner
concerning the proposed commitment.52
49
See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, Comparing Regulatory
Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309, 328 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds.,
2010).
50
In addition to the requirements of Executive Order 12,866, Executive Order
13,609 was adopted in 2012 to promote international cooperation in regulatory
matters. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012). Such
cooperation would facilitate the work of federal agencies and their foreign
counterparts “[i]n meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor,
security, environmental, and other issues, . . . [and] can also reduce, eliminate, or
prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.” Id. § 1.
51
Publication, Coordination, and Reporting of International Agreements:
Amendments, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,831 (May 18, 2006) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 181).
52
22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(2) (2018). See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL § 724.3(e) (2006) (requiring that action memorandum “shall
indicate whether a proposed treaty or agreement embodies a commitment that could
reasonably be expected to require (for its implementation) the issuance of a
‘significant regulatory action’ (as defined in section 3 of Executive Order 12866); and
if so, what arrangements are being planned or carried out concerning timely
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Despite these provisions, it does not appear that any regulations
or rules arising from human rights treaties under consideration
by the United States have been subjected to cost-benefit analysis,
regulatory impact assessments, or any form of OIRA review.
There may be several reasons why human rights treaties
have not been subject to the rigors of cost-benefit analysis. Some
regulations and rules that may arise out of a proposed treaty
may simply be excluded from the regulatory review process by
the terms of Executive Order 12,866.53 This order excludes
regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs
function of the United States.54 Other regulations and rules may
also fall outside the definition of significant regulatory action
because they do not have an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more or they do not otherwise adversely affect the
economy.55 Government statements made during the treaty
ratification process often result in the exclusion of regulations
and rules from cost-benefit analysis. To gain domestic support
for ratification, for example, the U.S. Senate regularly attaches
declarations of non-self-execution to human rights treaties.
Essentially, these declarations limit the domestic “costs” of treaty
implementation by indicating that a treaty will not give rise to
enforceable rights or domestic obligations in the absence of
further congressional action.56 Such declarations may forestall
the need for any regulations or rules. In addition, the Executive
branch will often assert that a treaty will not result in any
significant changes to U.S. law or practice.57 While these
consultation with OMB.”). In addition, federal agencies are required to consult with
OMB if a proposed international agreement “embodies a commitment to furnish
funds, goods, or services that are beyond or in addition to those authorized in an
approved budget.” 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(1).
53
See, e.g., Implementation of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty Between
the United States and the United Kingdom, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,592, 16,596 (Mar. 21,
2012) (“The Department is of the opinion that restricting defense articles exports is a
foreign affairs function of the United States Government and that rules governing
the conduct of this function are exempt from the requirements of Executive order
12866.”).
54
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(d)(2) (Sept. 30, 1993).
55
Id. § 3(f).
56
See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to
Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 145–46, 153 (2012);
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 703–04 (1995).
57
See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, June 30,
2009, S. TREATY DOC. No. 112-7 (2009) (stating that Convention provisions cannot be
directly enforced by U.S. courts or give rise to individually enforceable rights in the
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statements are made to gain support for ratification, they may
actually be counterproductive because they do not allow for
meaningful assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed
treaty.
In cases of human rights treaties, the regulatory assessment
process may also be limited because it only focuses “on benefits
and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of the United
States.”58 If a federal regulation will have an impact outside the
United States, such effects are reported separately.59 Bifurcating
the domestic and foreign effects of a proposed treaty may be
reasonable because it highlights the unique domestic costs and
benefits that flow from proposed regulatory action. However,
foreign effects should not be wholly excluded from the analysis
because they may also provide both costs and benefits to the
United States.60
Cost-benefit analysis may thus offer an important
contribution to treaty ratification debates in the United States.61
A regulatory impact assessment that fully monetizes the benefits
of protecting human rights, including the costs that occur when
rights are violated, could justify ratification of long-stalled
treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities.62 The arguments used against these treaties
United States); S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 9 (2012) (stating that key Convention terms
should be defined to be coextensive with terms in existing U.S. law); cf. Yvonne M.
Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: The Role of
Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (2012); Oona A. Hathaway,
The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1822, 1832, 1856 (2003).
58
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-4 (2003).
59
Id.
60
See Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499,
573 (2014).
61
See, e.g., Have Human Rights Treaties Failed?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-human-rights-treatiesfailed.
62
See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, The Time Has Come for the United States to
Ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 195, 196 (2010); Tara J. Melish, The UN
Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should
Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 37, 42 (2007); Martha Middleton, The Last Holdout, ABA
J., Mar. 2016, at 64; Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children? A
Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 172 (2006); cf. Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes
Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS Ratification Will Herald Europe’s
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typically do not address the monetized benefits of protecting
human rights.63 And, they do not assess these benefits against
the costs of treaty implementation. Cost-benefit analysis could
thus be used to complement the normative arguments made in
support of ratification. Of course, such analysis could provide
reasons against ratification.64
Cost-benefit analysis may also offer insights into the study of
human rights. In recent years, questions surrounding treaty
ratification and compliance have received significant
consideration.65 Why do states ratify some human rights treaties
and not others? Why do states comply with some treaty
obligations and not others? A rigorous analysis that monetizes
the costs and benefits of protecting human rights may reveal
unique values that have not been considered in prior studies.
This may explain why states ratify certain treaties and allocate
more resources to comply with certain treaty obligations.66 This
Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 155–56 (2009)
(arguing that the regulatory requirements of Executive Order 12,866 should apply to
discussions on the proposed ratification of UNCLOS).
63
But see Varun Gauri, The Cost of Complying with Human Rights Treaties:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and Basic Immunization, 6 REV. INT’L
ORGS. 33 (2011).
64
As a general matter, cost-benefit analysis does not address normative
(political) arguments. See generally THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE
PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1996). But see Louis E.
Wolcher, Senseless Kindness: The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 LAW & INEQ.
147 (2007).
65
Treaty compliance is of significant interest to lawyers, economists, and
political scientists. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Influence of
History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights Obligations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 211
(2016); Geoff Dancy & Kathryn Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights
Prosecutions: Toward a Transnational Theory of Treaty Compliance, 44 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 751 (2012); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of
Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton &
James Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact Through Qualitative and
Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Daniel W. Hill, Jr.,
Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161
(2010); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000); Richard A. Nielsen & Beth
A. Simmons, Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International
Human Rights Regime?, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 197 (2015); Wayne Sandholtz, Domestic
Law and Human Rights Treaty Commitments: The Convention against Torture, 16 J.
HUM. RTS. 25 (2017); Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010).
66
See, e.g., Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 29 (2006) (“Undoubtedly most states generally
place their own economic self-interest above principled responses to human rights
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approach offers a competing empirical narrative to critiques that
question the efficacy and relevance of human rights treaties.67
The use of cost-benefit analysis need not be limited to the
study of treaties. It can also be used to study the development of,
and compliance with, customary international law.68
By
monetizing the costs and benefits of accepting and complying
with customary norms, cost-benefit analysis can offer some
clarity to the study of human rights norms that have not yet been
codified but are still binding on states.69 It could explain, for
example, why some norms rise to the level of custom through
consistent state practice and others do not. It could even explain
why some customary norms are more likely to be complied with
than other norms.
In addition to studying the decisions of individual states,
cost-benefit analysis could be used to examine multilateral
efforts to protect human rights. The principles of cost-benefit
analysis apply with equal rigor to multilateral efforts. For
example, the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) movement has
gained greater traction in recent years as the United Nations
seeks to convince states of their obligation to prevent serious
human rights abuses.70 The R2P movement calls for collective
state action to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious human rights abuses.71
Presumably, the principles underlying the R2P movement could
conditions outside their own territory.”); Simon SC Tay, Southeast Asian Fires: The
Challenge for International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, 11
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 289−90 (1999) (“Common sense dictates that
cooperation will only succeed if, for all parties, the benefits exceed the cost.”).
67
See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). But see
Neil A. Englehart & Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect: International Law’s
Impact on Women’s Rights, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 22 (2014); Christopher J. Fariss, Respect
for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standards of
Accountability, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014).
68
See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance and
Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L.
389, 399–404 (2014) (suggesting that cost-benefit analysis plays a role in
determining whether a state complies with customary international law).
69
For other efforts to assess customary international law, see id. at 394; George
Norman & Joel Trachtman, Measuring the Shadow of the Future: An Introduction to
the Game Theory of Customary International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 129–30
(2008).
70
See, e.g., ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A DEFENSE 1,
4–5, 7 (2015) (providing a brief history of R2P and how the United Nations Security
Council adopted resolutions reaffirming R2P); THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7–12 (W. Andy Knight & Frazer Egerton eds., 2012).
71
G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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be extended to any acts that pose significant harms to human
life.72 Arguments in support of the R2P movement have often
focused on normative and legal justifications.73 Arguments
against the R2P movement raise resource limitations and also
legal concerns.74 By monetizing human rights and comparing the
benefits of protecting these rights with their attendant costs,
cost-benefit analysis could offer empirical support for
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the influential AlbrightCohen report on atrocity prevention makes clear that preventive
action is more cost-effective than inaction.75 Efforts to promote
international cooperation on other matters of global concern,
such as climate change or famine relief, could likewise gain
greater support through rigorous cost-benefit analysis.76 If
human rights are monetizable, the benefits of intervention may
be easier to see and harder to ignore.

72

INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at

viii.
73

See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (5th ed. 2015); Terry Nardin, From Right to Intervene to
Duty to Protect: Michael Walzer on Humanitarian Intervention, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L.
67, 68–70 (2013); Chris O’Meara, Should International Law Recognize a Right of
Humanitarian Intervention?, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 441, 443–44, 447, 451 (2017).
74
Kim R. Holmes, The Weakness of the Responsibility to Protect as an
International
Norm,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(Jan.
7,
2014),
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-weakness-the-responsibilityprotect-international-norm; see, e.g., David Fetherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to
the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychological Numbing, 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 283, 284, 298–99 (1997); Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and
Mass Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126, 134–37
(Eldar Shafir ed., 2012); Paul Slovic, When (In)action Speaks Louder than Words:
Confronting the Collapse of Humanitarian Values in Foreign Policy Decisions, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 24, 25, 27 (2015); Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign
Lives in Genocides & Mass Atrocities: Law, Humanitarian Intervention, and the
Prominence Effect, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 32, 34–36 (2015).
75
GENOCIDE PREVENTION TASK FORCE, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT
FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS, at xv (2008) (“If the United States does not engage early in
preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding millions of
refugees and trying to manage long-lasting regional crises.”).
76
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE TO RESOLVING DISPUTES
AND FACILITATING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 3–35 (Gunnar Sjöstedt & Ariel
Macaspac Penetrante eds., 2013); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime
Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. POL. 7, 7, 16–17 (2011).
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IV. THE LIMITS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The use of cost-benefit analysis is not without its critics,
many of whom question the appropriateness and accuracy of the
valuation process.77 These criticisms are magnified when human
rights are at issue.78 As Sally Engle Merry has written, the
process of quantification “risks distorting the complexity of social
phenomena.”79 While it allows for effective comparisons, it also
strips norms “of their context, history, and meaning.”80 In fact,
such criticisms were leveled at the PREA regulatory approval
process, even though that process eventually concluded that
preventing sexual violence in the prison system was costeffective.81 The criticisms were twofold.
First, protecting individuals from egregious human rights
abuses, such as sexual violence, should not be conditioned on
whether it is financially feasible to do so. Critics argued that
individuals should always be protected from such harms
regardless of the costs. In criticizing the PREA regulatory
approval process, Lisa Heinzerling challenged the suggestion
that cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate methodology for
determining whether individuals were entitled to protection from
sexual violence: “In the topsy-turvy world of cost-benefit analysis,
DOJ was compelled to treat rape as just another market
exchange, coercion as a side note, and the elimination of prison
rape as a good idea only if the economic numbers happened to
come out that way.”82 Ronald Dworkin has offered a similar
criticism of cost-benefit analysis when he noted that some harms

77
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2004).

ON KNOWING

78
See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Valuing Life: A Human Rights Perspective on the
Calculus of Regulation, 36 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 & n.12 (2018).
79
SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING
HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX TRAFFICKING 1 (2016). But see JoséMiguel Bello y Villarino & Ramona Vijeyarasa, The Indicator Fad: How Quantifiable
Measurement Can Work Hand-in-Hand with Human Rights—A Response to Sally
Engle Merry’s The Seductions of Quantification, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 985
(2018).
80
MERRY, supra note 79, at 1. While Merry acknowledges the “power of
quantitative knowledge,” she urges restraint in its application and a clear
understanding of how data is compiled and assessed. Id. at 26.
81
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1–2.
82
Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark: The Department of Justice’s
Economic Analysis of Prison Rape, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (June 13, 2012),
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2012/06/cost-benefit-jumpsthe-shark.html.
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are so egregious they cannot be assessed through mathematical
calculations and that “[a] civilised society recognises rights
precisely to protect individuals from these grave harms.”83
Second, the market-based assumptions that underlie costbenefit analysis seem poorly situated for assessing the value of
human rights. As part of the PREA regulatory approval process,
the DOJ was required to monetize the value to detainees of not
being subjected to sexual violence. It did so through contingent
valuation by “asking how much money the victims of rape would
be willing to pay to avoid rape and also asking how much money
these victims would be willing to accept in exchange for being
raped.”84 Critics argued that such monetization of human rights
is neither feasible nor accurate. Several human rights groups,
including Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Defense
Center, submitted statements to DOJ addressing the cost-benefit
analysis conducted during the PREA approval process.85 Human
Rights Watch expressed several concerns in its DOJ submission,
noting that “estimating the monetary ‘costs’ of crime is at best a
fraught and imperfect effort, particularly when dealing with
crimes such as sexual abuse whose principal cost is due to the
pain, suffering, and quality of life diminution of the victims.”86
Significantly, Human Rights Watch took this position even
though it ultimately supported the PREA regulations. The
methodological limitations of such calculations seem evident.
How can human rights be monetized or meaningfully calculated?

83

Ronald Dworkin, It Is Absurd To Calculate Human Rights According to CostBenefit Analysis, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2006/may/24/comment.politics.
84
Heinzerling, supra note 82.
85
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTS ON THE NATIONAL STANDARDS TO
PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE, PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE ON FEBRUARY 3, 2011, at 1–2 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/related_material/Human%20Rights%20Watch%20Comments%20on%20
Prison%20Rape%20Standards.pdf; Letter from Paul Wright, Exec. Dir., Human
Rights Def. Ctr. & Alex Friedmann, Assoc. Editor, Prison Legal News, to Robert
Hinchman, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 3, 2010)
(on file with author); see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE ET AL., PROTECTING
YOUTH IN THE PREA NATIONAL STANDARDS (2011), http://cclp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/PREA-Youth-Comments.pdf; JUST DET. INT’L, COMMENTS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON
NATIONAL STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE (2011),
https://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Comments-Submitted-to-theDepartment-of-Justice-Notice.pdf.
86
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 85, at 3.
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And yet, advocates of cost-benefit analysis would argue
valuation is possible. In assessing whether the value of human
life could be subject to economic analysis, for example, Thomas
Schelling argued in 1968 that such efforts are both feasible and
warranted.87 It is possible to monetize the value a society places
on reducing mortality risks. According to Schelling, “people have
been dying for as long as they have been living; and where life
and death are concerned we are all consumers. We nearly all
want our lives extended and are probably willing to pay for it.”88
To this end, states have regularly used calculations regarding the
value of a statistical life (VSL) to quantify the value placed on
reductions in mortality risks.89 Federal agencies have used VSL
calculations to assess countless regulatory proposals, including
cigarette warning labels, food safety standards, and ejection
mitigation requirements for vehicles.90 VSL calculations have
even been used to assess the costs of war.91 In fact, these
valuation efforts, which are regularly used by the federal
government to make regulatory decisions that implicate human
life, may offer the best example for using cost-benefit analysis to
assess the feasibility of protecting human rights.92
Admittedly, some human rights would pose unique
challenges to cost-benefit analysis.93 There are several human
rights norms that reflect unique interests and values within the
international community. In such cases, monetization may be
particularly difficult.

87

Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968).
88
Id. at 128–29.
89
See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique,
2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 201–08 (2000).
90
SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 185–93.
91
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR
WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 94–96 (2008). But see MICHAEL
WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 88–91 (2004).
92
Using VSL calculations to assess the appropriateness of regulations that
implicate human life has been subject to some criticism. See GILLES CARBONNIER,
HUMANITARIAN ECONOMICS: WAR, DISASTER AND THE GLOBAL AID MARKET 106–07
(2015); ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 225–32
(2010); Aceves, supra note 78, at 3; Trudy Ann Cameron, Euthanizing the Value of a
Statistical Life, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 161, 161–62 (2010).
93
Cf. GHK CONSULTING LTD., HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND
POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS 7–8 (2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PRO
JECTS/Resources/40940-1331068268558/Report_Development_Fragility_Human_
Rights.pdf.
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Consider the prohibition against genocide. The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was
established because the international community recognized that
the destruction of national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups
represented a profound loss to all humanity.94 In fact, the loss of
any such group was viewed as far more consequential than the
loss associated with the sum of its individual members.95 As a
result, the crime of genocide is seen as a unique crime that
affects all humanity and implicates the peace and security of the
international community.96 It is difficult to envision how costbenefit analysis could properly monetize the value in preventing
genocide.97 Calculating the value of an entire national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group—including its history, culture,
tradition, and collective memory—would pose extraordinary
challenges. When human rights norms incorporate the moral
interests and collective values of the international community,
monetization may prove to be quite difficult.
But again, advocates of cost-benefit analysis would argue
that monetization of moral interests or complex values is, in fact,
possible. According to Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, even
moral interests are subject to valuation and should be monetized
in cost-benefit analysis. “If people lose welfare because of the
suffering or death of others . . . their loss ought to be counted.”98
To disregard moral interests would ignore an important value
that should be considered in any cost-benefit analysis. It should
not be surprising, then, that the federal regulatory review
process supports such valuation efforts. Executive Order 12,866
compels federal agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis of
significant regulatory actions, and it requires this analysis to
consider both quantitative and qualitative measures.99 Executive
Order 13,563 adds that agencies “may consider (and discuss
94

United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
95
See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL 268–69 (1963); BEREL LANG, GENOCIDE: THE ACT AS IDEA 28–29 (2017);
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 91 (1944); David Luban,
Arendt on the Crime of Crimes, 28 RATIO JURIS 307, 309 (2015).
96
See Reservations to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
97
Cf. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
931, 934 (2000).
98
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1813.
99
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1(a) (Sept. 30, 1993).
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qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify,
including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.”100 OIRA also acknowledges that some costs and
benefits may be difficult to monetize.101 In such cases, federal
agencies are instructed to use their best efforts and to explain
such costs and benefits through various assessments, including
breakeven analysis.102 If a federal agency fails to consider these
values in its calculations, OIRA may reject the proposed
regulations.103 In addition, such action may also be a violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which precludes agencies from
acting arbitrarily.104
CONCLUSION
This Article recognizes that efforts to promote and protect
human rights through references to morality or normative
suasion have not always succeeded. This explains one of the
shortcomings of the modern human rights movement.105 Indeed,
Jeremy Bentham’s acerbic critique of rights as “anarchical
fallacies” and “nonsense upon stilts” still resonates over 170
years later.106
At a minimum, a new discourse is necessary—one that
empowers advocates by reframing the debate over human rights.
For these reasons, “[i]t is time to start over with an approach to
promoting wellbeing . . . that is empirical rather than
ideological.”107 Cost-benefit analysis thus offers a provocative
100

Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, § 1(c) (Jan. 21, 2011).
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 58, at 27.
102
Id. at 2.
103
Regulations and Rulemaking Process, OFF. OF INFO. AND REG. AFF.,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
104
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1813; see also Ohio v. United States
Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
105
See generally ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING TO PROTECT: THE U.N. AND THE
POLITICIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015); STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY (2010); Conor Gearty, Is the Human Rights Era Drawing to a Close?, 2017
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 425 (2017); cf. Shima Baradaran et al., Does International
Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2013); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of
“International Law”, THE NAT’L INT., Winter 1989/90, at 3.
106
Jeremy Bentham, Nonsense Upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND
REFORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 319, 330 (Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002).
107
Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights; see
also Edward Anderson, Economics and Human Rights, in RESEARCH METHODS IN
101
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opportunity for the human rights movement. However, its
contributions must be balanced against both normative and
pragmatic considerations.108
Philosophically, can rights be
monetized without devaluing life and debasing human dignity?
Practically, are monetization efforts feasible or valid? Legally, do
these efforts themselves violate human rights norms such as the
principle of equality and the right to life? In assessing the best
path forward, human rights advocates must thus engage in their
own cost-benefit analysis.

HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 94, 95; GHK CONSULTING LTD.,
supra note 93, at 6.
108
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits to CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005 (2000) (critiquing the ability of cost-benefit
analysis to answer difficult questions).

